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Kant is that it is able and suggestive. On this point there can, perhaps, be no question. The criticism, which is generally fair and sympathetic, is evidently based upon a thorough familiarity with Kant's philosophy, and in many respects it is illuminating. It is a criticism which no student of Kant can afford to neglect.

But when one comes to examine the constructive part of the book, one is bound to feel that the results are problematic. Whether Dr. Ewald meets successfully the very difficulty which he justly finds in the system of Kant is, perhaps, more than questionable. His very sharp distinction between perception (*Anschauung*) and knowledge (*Erkenntniss*), by means of which he hopes to escape the subjective tendencies that seem to have engulfed Kant, ultimately proves to be a rather dangerous partition of experience. The logical result of such a violent division of the process of knowledge seems to be epistemological dualism; and whether the author succeeds in bridging the chasm which he thus makes in the realm of knowledge is, one is inclined to say, more than doubtful. If it be true that the problem of knowledge is *in toto* different from the problem of perception (p. 16), then it certainly is not easy to see how the categories of knowledge bear any intelligible relation to the subject-matter of sensuous experience. The position that the categories approximate realization in the realm of perception (pp. 223, 237, etc.) seems to involve all the weaknesses of Fichte's doctrine concerning objectivity. It would appear that Dr. Ewald is logically in the same predicament in which he finds Kant—bound either to subjectivism or to abstract dualism in his epistemology.

There is one feature of Dr. Ewald's book which is deserving of especial emphasis. Whatever may be the actual results of the book, its purpose is to build upon history. The criticism which the author makes of Kant is not made solely for the sake of criticism; rather is its aim to bring the system of Kant into vital and potent relation to contemporaneous problems, to discover in the system a secure foundation upon which further to build. And this historical attitude, which is ever anxious to learn from past thinkers, to assimilate and expand the truth attained by them and to avoid the errors into which they fell, is an attitude which, in the field of philosophy at any rate, can hardly be too strongly commended. If the book before us had no other merit than this one, it would certainly be worth the while.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1908. *On the Meaning of Truth* (pp. 579–591): Charles M. Bakewell. – Truth is conceiving an object in its total context. It is grasping the transient fact in its transcendent context. *The Nature and Criterion of Truth* (pp. 592–605): J. E. Creighton. – Philosophic truth not to be confused with the conditioned truth of science or practical need. The estimate of facts

requires a theory of experience, and this is a philosophy. The guide to the philosophic standpoint is the history of philosophy, whence our instruments for interpreting experience are derived. We can not, as the pragmatists try to do, define the nature of truth without reference to metaphysics. *Self-Realization and the Criterion of Goodness* (pp. 606–618): HENRY W. WRIGHT. – Recent criticism of the concept of self-realization as an ethical ideal proceeds from a failure to define properly the function of self. Since the self is an organizing agency, the object of supreme worth is an organized life. *The Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge* (pp. 619–642): G. W. CUNNINGHAM. – Conception is the penetration of the object, which is thereby appropriated and possessed. When Hegel teaches that thought is conterminous with the real he states that experience and reality are one. *Reviews of Books:* Theodor Elsenhans, *Fries und Kant:* ELLEN BLISS TALBOT. W. B. Pillsbury, *Attention:* CHAS. H. JUDD. A. Fouillée, *Morale des idées-forces:* W. G. EVERETT. *Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1908. *Le souvenir du présent et la fausse reconnaissance* (pp. 561–593): H. BERGSON. – A criticism of current explanations of the illusion that one is reliving some instants of one's past life, and an interpretation of the phenomenon as a result of the interplay of perception and memory under conditions of a lowered tone of attention to life. *La triple origine de l'idée de Dieu* (pp. 594–612): G. BELOT. – The idea of God is the product of religious tradition, abstract reflection, and ill-defined, unexplained, subjective impressions. *La logique de l'analogie* (pp. 613–636): A. CHIDE. – Logicians are inclined to reduce analogy to second place, but it is involved in the establishment of all categories of inductive and deductive logic. *Revue générale:* F. Picavet, *Thomisme et philosophies médiévales. Analyses et comptes rendus:* Boutroux, *Science et religion dans la philosophie contemporaine:* F. PILLON. Arnal, *La philosophie religieuse de Ch. Renouvier:* J. BARUZI. *Notices bibliographique:* R. de Gourmont, *Promenades philosophiques:* L. ARRÉAT. Voivenel, *Littérature et folie;* Sighele, *Littérature et criminalité;* Mairet, *La simulation de la folie:* CH. BLONDEL. *Revue des périodiques étrangers.*

Avenarius, Richard. *Kritik der reinen Erfahrung.* Edited by J. Petzoldt. Band II. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland. 1908. Pp. xii + 536.

Elsee, Charles. *Neoplatonism in Relation to Christianity.* Cambridge: The University Press. 1908. Pp. xii + 144.

Joyce, George Hayward. *Principles of Logic.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1908. Pp. xx + 431.

Külpe, O. *Immanuel Kant.* Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1908. Pp. vi + 163. 1.25 M.

Maclaren, Shaw. *What and Why, Being the Philosophy of Things as They Are.* London: Allen. 1908. Pp. xvii + 118.

Piat, Clodius. *Insuffisance des philosophies de l'intuition.* Paris: Plon-Nourrit. 1908. Pp. 319.

Pigou, A. C. *The Problem of Theism and Other Essays.* London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1908. Pp. viii + 139.

Rasmussen, Knud. *The People of the Polar North.* Compiled from the Danish originals, and edited by G. Herring. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1908. Pp. xix + 358. £1 1s. *net.*

Richert, Hans. *Schopenhauer.* Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.

The Works of Aristotle. Translated into English under the editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross. Volume III. *Metaphysica.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1908. 7s. 6d. *net.*

NOTES AND NEWS

THE Pathological Institute, of Wards Island, New York City, has sent out the following announcement: "The Neurological Institute, in Frankfurt on Main, in connection with the Frankfurt Special Classes (help schools) will arrange a two-weeks' course in 'The Problems concerning Feeble-minded and Psychopathic Children.' This is to be given the latter part of June, 1909. Scientific research, clinics, psychology, education and methods, and forensic questions will be the subjects of lectures and courses by specialists. The course is intended for those who are professionally engaged in this work, or are interested in it, or who wish to prepare themselves for it. It aims to offer a basis for extended work, a survey of the whole affair and its practical management. Accordingly the chief emphasis will be laid on practical presentations and demonstrations (anatomical, pedagogical, experimental, and presentation of patients). As far as possible all sides of the subject and their bearing on other branches of knowledge will be considered. The following courses and demonstrations are planned: normal and pathological anatomy of the juvenile brain; child psychology; psychopathology of youth; instruction of the feeble-minded; methods of teaching; organization; hand training; institutional affairs and care for the inmates; clinic for feeble-minded children; care and education in institutions and forensic psychiatry; juvenile courts; social care; speech therapeutics (articulation); hygiene; care for the deaf-dumb, the blind, and cripples. A series of schools for feeble-minded, institutions, clinics, and scientific institutes will be visited. The detailed program will appear in the spring. For particulars address the Committee: Privatdozent Dr. H. Vogt, Neurologisches Institut, Gartenstrasse, Frankfurt a. M., or Rector A. Henze, Wiesenhüttenschule, Frankfurt a. M."

A SERIES of lectures on "Charles Darwin and His Influence on Science" will be given at Columbia University on Friday afternoons, from February 12 to April 16, 1909, in 309 Havemeyer Hall, at 4:10 P.M., with the exception of the introductory lecture, which was given at 11:10 A.M., on February 12, the one hundredth anniversary of Darwin's birth. The lectures, which are open to the public, are as follows: February 12, "Darwin's Life and Work," by Henry Fairfield Osborn;